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On-Line Conditional Anomaly Detection in
Multivariate Data for Transformer Monitoring
V. M. Catterson, Member, IEEE, S. D. J. McArthur, Senior Member, IEEE, G. Moss
Abstract—Retrofitting condition monitoring systems to aging
plant can be problematic, since the particular signature of normal
behavior will vary from unit to unit. This paper describes
a technique for anomaly detection within the context of the
conditions experienced by an in-service transformer, such as
loading, seasonal weather, and network configuration. The aim is
to model the aged but normal behavior for a given transformer,
while reducing the potential for anomalies to be erroneously
detected. The paper describes how this technique has been
applied to two transmission transformers in the UK. A case
study of twelve months of data is given, with detailed analysis of
anomalies detected during that time.
Index Terms—Power transformers, Monitoring, Fault diagno-
sis
I. INTRODUCTION
POWER transformers in the transmission network tend tobe a focus for condition monitoring research and appli-
cation, being expensive assets crucial to network operation.
The anticipated return on condition monitoring comes from a
reduction in maintenance costs and delayed replacement, but
these benefits can only be realized by accurate, timely health
information that truly reflects the current state of the plant.
To date, monitoring of transformers largely concerns single
sensors, such as temperature [1], vibration [2], [3], or furan
analysis [1]. In some cases, multiple sensors of the same type
are used for corroboration and location of signals, including
radio frequency (RF) sensors for partial discharge monitoring
[4], [5]. Dissolved gas analysis (DGA) is a commonly em-
ployed technique for transformer health monitoring, which re-
quires sampling of the transformer oil to determine constituent
levels of key gases [6]. In all these cases, health analysis is
based on the interpretation of a single type of data, using
engineering expertise directly or through automated systems
to find meaning in the data.
Multivariate data interpretation may increase the accuracy
of health analysis, as it can offer corroboration across datasets.
More diagnostic information can be gleaned from the co-
occurrence or otherwise of events in, say, temperature and
vibration data than in either set alone. However, extra data in-
creases the complexity of the diagnostic task, as the interaction
of different types of data may not be fully understood.
As an example application, two transmission transformers
at a UK transmission substation are at the end of their design
life, but it is hoped they can be kept in service with inten-
sive condition monitoring. A combination of on-line sensors
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including temperature, vibration, current, and dissolved gas
sensors are installed on both units.
This multivariate monitoring scenario has certain features
that mean diagnostic monitoring is not straight-forward. Sen-
sors have been retrofit to both units, meaning that there is
no historical body of data that can be used to help interpret
new measurements. However, it is known that over the years
of operation each unit has developed its own particular data
signature that is different from a new unit. This includes a
moderately high level of hydrogen in the DGA profile (which
has remained static in recent years and is therefore not due to
an ongoing problem). This means that both transformers have
known, prior faults that have left residual low levels of fault
indicators, while not requiring any immediate maintenance.
This situation is common. Condition monitoring is often ap-
plied towards the end of life when critical faults are expected;
but by that stage years of operation have led to a particular
‘fingerprint’ representing normal behavior for one unit, which
could be considered faulty behavior if it suddenly manifest in
another. The key is to recognize changes in behavior, which
can be more indicative of faults developing in older units than
absolute values of measurements.
Anomaly detection techniques are a way of recognizing
changes in plant behavior. Rather than simply matching pat-
terns of expected faults, a model of behavior specific to
each transformer under study can be trained to represent the
normal operation of that particular asset. New measurements
can be compared against the model to quantify how likely or
anomalous they are. This allows for the natural differences
between normal behavior in different transformers, and low
level fault behavior can be trained into the model as normal
for that unit. The combination of anomaly detection with fault
classification can enhance the diagnosis of faults, by reserving
fault classification for situations where an anomaly is detected,
thus reducing the volume of data engineers must examine [7].
This paper describes the technique of Conditional Anomaly
Detection, and details how it has been applied to the applica-
tion transformers. This represents a new approach to condition
monitoring, by considering normal and abnormal behavior in
the context of plant operating conditions. The application is
described in Section II, with an overview of anomaly detection
techniques in Section III. Details of Conditional Anomaly
Detection are given in Section IV, with some parameter
requirements outlined in Section V. Section VI reports a case
study of the technique applied to twelve months of transformer
data, with the structure of the on-line anomaly detection
software described in Section VII, and conclusions following.
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TABLE I
SENSORS ON THE MORE-AGED T1 AND LESS-AGED T2
Subsystem Sensors
T1 main tank temperature (4), vibration (4), 3-phase current
T1 oil top & bottom temperature and moisture, TRANSFIX
T1 pumps, fans vibration (6) and load current
T1 tap changer temperature, vibration, load current
T2 main tank temperature (2), vibration (2), 3-phase current
T2 oil top and bottom oil temperature
T2 pumps, fans vibration (4)
T2 tap changer temperature and vibration
II. APPLICATION DESCRIPTION
Two 275/132kV, 180MVA transformers have been in oper-
ation at a UK transmission substation for the span of their
design life. One is showing more signs of aging than the
other, and has been fitted with a Kelman TRANSFIX on-line
dissolved gas analyzer1 for over a year. A project was initiated
to install a large number of sensors—primarily temperature,
vibration, and current—at different locations on the main tanks
and auxiliary systems, in order to investigate which techniques
can assist with this particular health assessment need.
Table I shows the number and types of sensors on each
transformer component. The majority of the sensors are lo-
cated on the more-aged transformer, with a subset on the
less-aged. Most of these sensors are externally fitted, with the
oil temperature and moisture measured internally. This meant
most sensors could be deployed without needing an outage.
In addition to the transformer sensors, the substation envi-
ronment is monitored by a weather station, which measures
parameters such as ambient temperature, rainfall duration, and
wind speed. Network parameters such as tap position are
recorded separately, giving a complete view of the conditions
under which the transformers are operating.
The dissolved gas analyzer takes nine separate measure-
ments every hour. Management and storage of this data
has been outsourced to a data warehousing company, which
records the gas data for all of the utility’s transformers.
Operational data is recorded through the SCADA system, and
controlled by the utility. All the other parameters are measured
once every five minutes, and collected and stored by a second
data warehousing company.
Since the first data warehouse and the SCADA data is highly
commercially sensitive, access to this data is tightly controlled.
Data relating to this site can be extracted and downloaded
manually by the utility engineers as needed. The data stored
in the second data warehouse relates only to this site, and
is less sensitive. Automated off-site access to this data was
available through a web service interface (described further in
Section VII), allowing download of data by all partners.
This installation was intended for investigating how moni-
toring of transformers could keep them in service for longer
as they reach the end of life. Known problems with the
design family meant that hydrogen levels were relatively high,
and fault diagnosis using Rogers’ Ratio [6] indicated a low
temperature thermal fault. However, gas levels had remained
1This unit measures oil levels of hydrogen, methane, ethane, ethylene,
acetylene, oxygen, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and water.
static for a few years, and it was believed there was low risk
in continued operation.
Any changes to the normal parameter values should be
considered more significant than absolute levels, since it may
signify the inception of a new problem. Techniques such as
Rogers’ Ratio would be of little use in recognizing new fault
types, since the diagnosis would be skewed by the pre-existing
moderate levels of hydrogen. Instead of diagnosis, anomaly
detection was required. Further, the anomaly detection system
should be on-line to ensure anomalous behavior is detected at
the earliest opportunity. On-line analysis is key in evaluating
the risk of keeping these aged assets in operation.
III. ANOMALY DETECTION
Anomaly detection, sometimes called novelty detection, is
a general term for distinguishing outliers and unusual values
from normal or expected data. Chandola et al [8] define three
types of anomaly: point anomalies, contextual anomalies, and
collective anomalies. The first is simply outlier detection: is a
parameter at a point in the measurement space where it has
not been seen before? This could be the case if data generally
falls into one of two clusters, but a point is measured that falls
outside of either cluster.
Contextual anomalies take into account the context of
a measurement before deciding on its anomalousness. For
example, the top oil temperature in a transformer may be
significantly higher on one day of a month. This would appear
to be a point anomaly, but if the weather conditions were
particularly hot on that same day, the context suggests that
the oil temperature is high because of external conditions, and
is not an anomaly when viewed in context. Similarly, a top oil
temperature which is normal for the height of summer may
be considered anomalous when measured during winter.
The third type is a collective anomaly, where a collection
of linked data points are out of place. The linkage may be in
time (consecutive measurements in time series data) or space
(neighboring measurements within a location). An example
of time series data would be top oil measurements taken
throughout one day; this could be expected to increase through
the morning, reach a peak in the afternoon, then decrease
through the evening and night, due to weather and load. Oil
temperature would be more static throughout a day of an
outage, but the ambient temperature would still cause the same
pattern of behavior. Temperatures that remained fixed or even
decreased during the day would be an anomalous collection
of data, even if the specific temperature at any point in the
day is normal, and may indicate a sensor failure.
Condition monitoring systems within the power domain tend
to be point anomaly detection systems, allowing engineers to
set thresholds and limits on expected values. This includes
commercial systems such as the Kelman TRANSFIX dissolved
gas analyzer. Work on diesel generators showed how thresh-
olds could be extracted from a small set of training data when
no historical data exists [9].
However, the most interesting of approaches for plant
condition monitoring is contextual anomaly detection. There
are many factors that could provide context for parameter
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Fig. 1. CAD compares the likelihood of transformer indicator data against
environmental conditions to detect anomalies.
changes, including load, aging of components, harmonics on
the network, and seasonal and day-to-day weather variations.
Considering the context of monitoring data should provide a
means of limiting the number of false alarms generated by a
monitoring system, while also being sensitive to values which
are within normal thresholds, but unusual given other factors.
Considering the case study application outlined above and
the need for on-line operation, the contextual data that can be
accessed by an automated system is the weather and load data
recorded in the second data warehouse. The ambient substation
environment and the current load provide the context in which
the transformers are operating, and so the specific technique
for anomaly detection chosen for this application has to be
capable of incorporating multiple weather and transformer data
parameters. The selected technique is Conditional Anomaly
Detection.
IV. CONDITIONAL ANOMALY DETECTION
Conditional Anomaly Detection (CAD) is a contextual
anomaly detection technique based on the likelihood of indi-
cator parameter values occurring at the same time as environ-
mental parameter values [10]. Applied to the transformer mon-
itoring application, indicator parameters are those measured
from the plant under study, indicative of plant health, while
environmental parameters are those measuring the weather in
the substation and transformer load. The likelihood of indicator
values being seen under given environmental conditions can be
calculated from a CAD model, which comprises separate mod-
els for the statistical behavior of the plant and environment,
and probabilistic links between the two (shown in Figure 1).
Since the statistical models of plant and environment be-
havior are separate, they could be used individually for point
anomaly detection. The plant model can be used to calculate
the probability of new transformer measurements; a low prob-
ability indicates anomalous values that are not likely to occur.
However, the probabilistic link between the plant and the
environment models provides the contextual reasoning ability
about whether or not measurements are truly anomalous.
As an example, consider an environment model of ambient
temperature and transformer load current, with an indicator
model of top oil temperature. Viewed simplistically, the en-
vironment could be summarized as high load/hot day; high
load/cold day; low load/hot day; or low load/cold day. Each
of these four modes of operation will have associated likely
ranges of top oil temperature. In order to decide if a given
value of top oil temperature is anomalous or not, the current
mode of operation is assessed based on the environment
model, and the likelihood of the top oil temperature given these
operating conditions is calculated. With this model, anomalies
could be flagged in cases such as:
1) The environment model gives a high probability of high
load/hot day operation, and top oil temperature is higher
than normal for this case; or,
2) The environment model gives a high probability of
low load/cold day operation, and top oil temperature
is higher than normal for this case (but may be within
normal range for high load/hot day operation).
However, an anomaly would not be flagged if, say, a heat-
wave caused the ambient temperature to be so unusually high
that there is a low probability of being in any of the four
modes of operation. Intuitively, in such a case we may expect
top oil temperature to be unusually high as well, and so low
probability indicator values will not be defined as anomalous.
Considering this case in terms of the probabilistic models,
if the training data is very unlike the current environmental
conditions, then the coverage of the models does not extend
to the current situation, and we can make no firm judgement
about how likely or not the indicator values are. It is better to
label it as neither normal nor abnormal, than to flag something
as anomalous when the coverage of the model does not provide
information to support this. This approach will reduce the
number of false anomalies reported to engineers.
The modeling technique suggested by Song et al in [10]
for the environment and plant models is Gaussian mixture
modeling. This is described below.
A. Gaussian Mixture Modeling
Some datasets can be represented by a set of Gaussian
(normal) distributions, mixed together in different proportions.
The set of Gaussian components and their mixing proportions
constitute a probabilistic model of the dataset. The parameters
of the model are Θ = 〈θ0, θ1, . . . , θk〉 for k components.
Each θ comprises the Gaussian parameters 〈µ,Σ, pi〉 for mean,
variance, and mix proportion.
An example follows. Figure 2 shows a histogram of wind
direction from the first two weeks of September 2008, mea-
sured from the on-site environment. The x-axis denotes the
values of maximum direction in degrees, while the y-axis is
the number of times the corresponding value was seen, scaled
to a probability of occurrence. The distributions overlaid on
the histogram are the Gaussian components of a mixture model
trained on the data. It can be seen that peaks in the data
correspond with means of distributions, or peaks in the sum
of overlapping components.
This mixture of Gaussian components is a model of the
training data, and so may be expected to be generally represen-
tative of this parameter. New measurements of wind direction
can be assessed for likeliness by comparing them with the
probability density function of the above model. From the
model graph, it can be seen that a measurement of 350◦
has probability 0.005 and is fairly likely to occur, while a
measurement of 100◦ has probability 0.0013 (the sum of three
components) and is less likely to occur. This can be calculated
from the probability density function (PDF):
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Fig. 2. Histogram of wind direction as probabilities with components of a
GMM overlayed. The fifth component is not visible on this scale, due to its
large σ5 and small pi5.
fGMM (x) =
k∑
n=1
pinP (x|θn) (1)
P (x|θn) = 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (x− µn)
2
2σ2n
)
(2)
where σ is the standard deviation, and variance is σ2.
This example describes the single parameter case, where
Gaussian means are a single value. Gaussian mixture modeling
may also be applied to the multi-dimensional case, where
the means become vectors and variance translates to a co-
variance matrix. The probability density function in the multi-
dimensional case is:
fGMM (x) =
k∑
n=1
pinP (x|θn) (3)
P (x|θn) =
1
((2pi)d det |Σ|) 12 exp
(
− 1
2
(x− µ)T Σ−1(x− µ)
)
(4)
where d is the dimension of the data.
The remaining question is how to learn the parameters of
Θ that characterize the model. A common technique is to use
the Expectation Maximization algorithm, detailed below.
B. Expectation Maximization
This is an iterative technique that converges towards a
locally optimal set of values for unknown model parameters,
that maximize the likelihood of the overall model [11]. It can
be applied to a variety of learning problems, and is used three
times in Conditional Anomaly Detection: once each for train-
ing the environment and indicator Gaussian mixture models,
and once for learning the probabilistic mapping between the
models. The fit of a model to the training data can be assessed
by calculating the log likelihood of the model, which increases
with a more accurate fit.
There are two stages to the algorithm: an Expectation (E)
step, where values of the model parameters are fixed and
the resulting likelihood of the model is calculated; and a
Maximization (M) step, where this likelihood is used to update
the model parameter values. Each step is run alternately, and
the new model likelihood compared at the end of every E-step
with its previous value. The algorithm terminates when the
change in likelihood is smaller than a given tolerance, or after
a set number of iterations. The output model is the one with
the highest log likelihood generated by the training process.
For the Gaussian mixture model case, the E-step of the al-
gorithm involves computing γij , the probability that datapoint
i was generated by (comes from distribution) component j,
for all i up to N , and j up to k. The equation for this is:
γij =
det |Σj |−1/2 exp
(− 1
2
(xi − µj)T Σ−1j (xi − µj)
)
∑k
l=1 det |Σl|−1/2 exp
(− 1
2
(xi − µl)T Σ−1l (xi − µl)
)
(5)
From this set of probabilities, the log likelihood of the
model can be computed:
log(L(Θ|X)) =
N∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
pijγij (6)
Finally, the M-step of the algorithm computes updated
values for all 〈µj ,Σj , pij〉:
pi′j =
1
N
N∑
i=1
γij (7)
µ′j =
∑N
i=1 xiγij∑N
i=1 γij
(8)
Σ
′
j =
∑N
i=1(xi − µ′j)(xi − µ′j)T γij∑N
i=1 γij
(9)
C. Learning the CAD Model
The process of learning the Conditional Anomaly Detection
model has three steps [10]. The first is to learn a Gaussian
mixture model U of the environmental parameters. The second
is to learn a Gaussian mixture model V of the indicator
parameters, in this case the transformer parameters. The third
is to learn the mapping function between U and V , which is
formulated as an Expectation Maximization problem.
The E-step is to calculate all bkij , the probability that envi-
ronment datapoint xk was generated by component Ui while
indicator datapoint yk was generated by component Vj , given
that Ui was the generating component in the environment. The
equation for this is:
bkij =
fGMM (xk|Ui)pii fGMM (yk|Vj)p(Vj |Ui)∑nU
t=1
∑nV
h=1 fGMM (xk|Ut)pit fGMM (yk|Vh)p(Vh|Ut)
(10)
where nU and nV are the numbers of components in U and
V respectively.
The M-step maximizes the p(Vj |Ui) terms:
p(Vj |Ui)′ =
∑N
k=1 bkij∑N
k=1
∑nV
h=1 bkih
(11)
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As with training Gaussian mixture models, the log likeli-
hood is used to assess the fit of the model. This is calculated
by:
log(L(Θ|X,Y )) =
N∑
k=1
log fCAD(yk|Θ,xk) (12)
where the fCAD function is:
fCAD(yk|Θ,xk) =
nU∑
i=1
fGMM (xk|Ui)pii∑nU
t=1 fGMM (xk|Ut)pit
·∑nVj=1 fGMM (yk|Vj)p(Vj |Ui)
(13)
D. Detecting Anomalies
After the Gaussian mixture models and mapping probabili-
ties have been learned, they constitute the CAD model which
can be used for anomaly detection. This section describes the
method for anomaly detection proposed in the original Song et
al paper, explains why it is not directly applicable to the case
of transformer monitoring, and proposes a more appropriate
technique for this application.
Detection of anomalies involves calculating fCAD for new
measurements (eqn. 13). This function can be summarized in
English as the probability of indicator parameters having their
measured values, given the likelihood of seeing the current
environment parameter values. fCAD values decrease in the
presence of an anomalous indicator and a normal environment.
Song et al expected Conditional Anomaly Detection to be
applied to datasets which contain predominantly “normal”
behavior, that is, the data had been gathered during situations
where no major faults or deviations were observed, and
therefore it can be assumed to be representative of normality.
However, the reason for applying unsupervised learning to the
problem is that the contents of the dataset are unknown, and it
may therefore contain low level, non-critical anomalies such
as aging trends and slow fault inception. In order to allow
outliers in the training data to be recognized as anomalies
when encountered in the future, Song et al suggest picking a
threshold value of fCAD based on the percentage of points in
the training dataset that are expected to be anomalous.
For example, if it is thought that 1% of training mea-
surements are anomalous, the fCAD values of each training
datapoint should be sorted, and the lowest 1% examined.
The highest fCAD of this subset becomes the threshold for
detecting anomalies: any future measurement with an fCAD
value less than this threshold is deemed anomalous.
This threshold requires careful selection: if it is set too high,
the technique will be too sensitive to anomalies and engineers
may be overwhelmed with spurious alarms; but if set too
low, anomalies may be missed. In the case of the transformer
monitoring project, labeling 1% of data as anomalous would
result in 3 measurements per day being raised as anomalous,
seriously overestimating the true likelihood of an anomaly that
would be of interest to engineers. Visual analysis of site data
from the month of September revealed nothing anomalous,
indicating that the threshold for anomalous data in the training
dataset may be 0%. Therefore, another technique for setting
the anomaly threshold was required.
One way of approximating an appropriate threshold is to
select a reasonable value based on some test data, and refine
the estimate with more operational experience. Results of this
method applied to a case study are described in Section VI.
Additionally, through experimentation with site data it was
found that additional information can be extracted from the
CAD model which aids with the detection of “true” anomalies.
The most anomalous situations are indicated when fCAD =
0. It can be seen from eqn. 13 that this could be caused
when the probability density function of either U or V renders
a zero probability of the measurement, that is, when either
∀i fGMM (xk|Ui) = 0 or ∀j fGMM (yk|Vj) = 0. This would
mean that either the environmental conditions or the indicator
conditions differ so greatly from the training dataset that there
is no chance of one of the learned components covering those
values.
However, the meaning of these two cases is very different.
In the first case, the environment is so unusual compared with
the training examples that its probability is zero. This situation
ought to be considered non-anomalous, since an anomaly
in the environment means it cannot be predicted what the
indicator values should normally be, as the situation has not
been encountered in the training data. If this is the case, it
means a result of fCAD = 0 should not automatically be
labelled as an anomaly.
The second case, where ∀j fGMM (yk|Vj) = 0, is a true
anomaly. This result means that the indicator parameters are so
far outside expected values that the probability of them being
generated by the model is zero. As long as the environment
values have a non-zero probability of being generated, this is
a truly anomalous situation.
As a result, a novel means of using the CAD model to detect
anomalies is proposed:
1) Select an approximate threshold of fCAD value for rec-
ognizing anomalies, τ , either by Song et al’s percentage
method, or through experimentation;
2) Calculate fCAD for a new measurement;
3) If fCAD > τ , it is not anomalous;
4) If 0 < fCAD <= τ , it is anomalous;
5) If fCAD = 0, inspect the independent probabilities of
the environment and indicators:
p(env) =
nU∑
i=1
fGMM (xk|Ui)pii (14)
p(ind) =
nV∑
j=1
fGMM (yk|Vj)pij (15)
6) If p(env) = 0, it is not anomalous;
7) If p(ind) = 0, it is anomalous.
V. MODEL PARAMETER SELECTION
Careful selection of the input parameters to CAD is required
to gain best results. Since the environmental and indicator pa-
rameters are to be modeled as Gaussian mixtures, an accurate
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(a) Before binning, showing equal probabilities
(b) After binning, showing varying probabilities
Fig. 3. Section of a histogram before and after binning.
model requires that they truly look like a mixture of Gaussian
distributions. Further, if there is a linear dependency between
two model inputs, i.e. they are highly correlated, the Gaussian
mixture model collapses and cannot be trained. This is because
linear dependency results in a singular covariance matrix, yet
training requires the inverted covariance matrix in eqn. 5.
These requirements immediately discount the use of some
of the site parameters in the CAD model. For example, the
values of maximum, minimum, and average wind speed are
highly linearly dependent, meaning a model of environmental
parameters could not contain all three. Similarly, the three-
phase load currents are highly correlated, so only one phase
could be used in a model.
Many of the transformer parameters that could form the
indicator model look highly non-Gaussian. Histograms of
parameters such as the temperature of the tank at the neutral
end (“Neutral end tank temp”) show many measurement values
with single occurrences, which makes them unsuitable for
Gaussian mixture modeling. However, these occurrences often
have approximately the same values that differ only in the third
or fourth significant figure (see Figure 3(a)).
Rather than discounting these parameters from modeling,
the data was preprocessed to make it more suited to Gaussian
components. This was done by binning each measurement:
sorting datapoints into 400 equal-width bins per parameter.
The result is that the measurements differing by low significant
figures were counted as the same value for the purposes of his-
togram calculation, which in turn suits Gaussian components
better (Figure 3(b)). For consistency, this process was applied
to all parameters selected for modeling.
VI. CASE STUDY RESULTS
This section presents a case study of Conditional Anomaly
Detection applied to the site under study. Nine months of
operation of the more-aged transformer is considered, with
detail of the model training, test results, and analysis of the
anomalies observed.
An engineer’s visual inspection of site data from September
2008 concluded that the transformers were operating normally
during that time. No significant deviations in transformer
behavior were seen during October, although the ambient tem-
perature and other weather parameters were rather different.
As a result, data from September and October 2008 were used
as training data representing normal behavior and conditions.
The environment model was trained on ambient tempera-
ture, the load current of the yellow phase, solar radiation, wind
speed, and wind direction. Gaussian Mixture Models ranging
in size from five to 17 components were trained, with the log
likelihood and visual inspection guiding selection of the best
fit model. The 16-component model was chosen.
For the transformer behavior indicator model, parameters
relating to the transformer oil were chosen. This subsystem
is presented here for detailed study; however, it is only one
of a set of indicator models trained for different transformer
subsystems. For the application as a whole the parameters were
split into subsystems in order to support the engineer during
on-line operation, and this is discussed further in the following
section. This section describes one particular model in detail.
Bearing in mind the requirement of low linear dependency
between parameters in the model, only one of top and bottom
oil temperature, and top and bottom oil moisture could be
selected, so the model parameters were chosen to be top
oil temperature, bottom oil moisture, and hydrogen levels.
Gaussian Mixture Models ranging from five to 17 components
were trained on these parameters, and the 14-component model
was found to be the best fit.
After selecting the best environment and indicator models,
the CAD model was trained. The same training set of two
months of data was used, to find the correlations between
environment and indicator conditions.
The test set of data comprises the twelve months of oper-
ation following the training data, 1st November 2008 to 31st
October 2009. Based on the results of this testing, the threshold
for anomaly detection was set at 1× 10−20. The full test set
results are summarized in Table II.
The results from the month of March are most informative.
Figure 4 shows the values of fCAD, p(env), and p(ind) for
the measurements taken every five minutes throughout March
2009.
The most obvious outlier in this graph is measurement
8378, corresponding to 19:25 on March 30th, where the
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TABLE II
ANOMALIES DETECTED BY CAD MODEL IN THE 12 MONTH TEST SET
fCAD value Cause of fCAD = 0
Month 0 < f < 10−20 f = 0 p(env) p(ind) Anomalies
Nov 0 2 2 0 0
Dec 3 11 0 11 14
Jan 0 0 0 0 0
Feb 1 3 3 0 1
Mar 4 39 38 1 5
Apr 0 4 4 0 0
May 0 30 30 0 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0
Jul 0 1 0 1 1
Aug 0 0 0 0 0
Sep 0 0 0 0 0
Oct 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 4. CAD model output from March 2009, showing p(ind) has a higher
likelihood than p(env) for most of the month, with fCAD in between.
environmental conditions have a very low probability. Ambient
temperature, solar radiation, and load current are all within
normal ranges, but wind speed and direction are both abnor-
mally high at 1012.3◦ and 21m/s respectively. This suggests
temporary sensor failure as the cause. Since the environment
is very abnormal while the indicators are relatively normal, no
anomaly is detected.
Four outliers in fCAD can be seen, corresponding to un-
likely transformer conditions while the environment is rela-
tively normal (detailed in Figure 5). These are diagnosed as
anomalous, since fCAD falls below the anomaly threshold.
The exact times of these points are 14:35 on 4th, 13:15 on
5th, and 13:50 and 13:55 on 6th March. In all four cases, the
anomaly is due to very low bottom oil moisture levels between
0.1 and 10.1ppm, while normal levels are 55–95ppm. Top oil
temperature and hydrogen levels are within normal ranges.
Considering that these moisture measurements occur be-
tween normal readings, it is likely that these are due to sensor
problems. For example, at five minute intervals between 13:00
and 13:30 on 5th March, moisture levels are reported as 66.8,
64.8, 62.8, 10.1, 61.8, 62.8, and 64.8, which strongly suggests
the value at 13:15 is erroneous. Furthermore, an anomalously
low level of moisture is less of a concern that anomalously
high levels, especially since the top oil temperature is be-
tween 15 and 20◦C at these anomalous points. As a result,
these datapoints do not represent a serious problem with the
transformer.
Not shown in Figure 4 due to the scale of the graph is the
datapoint where the transformer indicator conditions have a
zero probability. This occurs at 14:30 on 4th March. All three
transformer parameters have highly anomalous values: top oil
temperature is recorded as −95◦C, moisture is −30.0ppm, and
hydrogen is −125.0ppm. As with the previous cases, this is
a problem with the sensors or data logger rather than a true
problem with the transformer.
Finally, the 38 cases of the environmental conditions having
zero probability are also sensor faults. In particular, the ambi-
ent temperature is measured as various unlikely high temper-
atures such as 255 and 19140◦C. No anomaly is diagnosed at
these points since the environmental conditions are so unlikely.
This study shows that the CAD model can identify anoma-
lous values in transformer measurements, while ignoring any
datapoints with anomalous environmental conditions. During
the period under study, 21 anomalies were found. In all cases,
these were found to be due to sensor or logging problems,
and not indicative of true transformer behavior. However,
in some of these cases the sensors returned anomalous but
plausible values, such as oil moisture of 10.1ppm, showing that
CAD accurately models the behavior of the given transformer,
and detects anomalies specific to this unit, which a simple
thresholding technique may not find.
VII. ON-LINE OPERATION
On-line anomaly detection was desirable for the site under
study, in order to gain early warning of potential deviations in
transformer behavior. This section describes the models used
for on-line data analysis, how the on-line system operates, and
what information is presented to engineers about anomalous
behavior.
Since Conditional Anomaly Detection is based on statistical
correlations within datasets, rather than knowledge of the links
between transformer components, it simply returns a value for
fCAD without any explanation of why measurements seem
anomalous. Within an on-line monitoring system, the reason
behind any anomalous behavior is of prime importance, as any
maintenance or operational decisions taken by the engineer
must be based on some rationale. With this in mind, the on-line
operation of Conditional Anomaly Detection aimed to give as
much information to the engineer as possible about potential
reasons for anomalies.
One way of enhancing information is to train and deploy
a suite of CAD models looking at different sub-components
within the transformers under study. The previous section
detailed the case study of a CAD model based on the oil
parameters of the more-aged transformer. By training multiple,
targeted indicator models, such as the oil model, a model of
tank temperatures, and a model of tap changer-related param-
eters, the system provides inherent correlation of anomalies
across subsystems. The engineer can be informed that, for
example, anomalies occurred at the same time in the oil and
tank models, or that an anomaly was isolated to the tank
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Fig. 5. CAD model output shows significant anomalies successfully detected in samples 1039, 1311, 1606, and 1607 from March 2009.
temperatures. This is more informative than anomaly detection
in a single, large CAD model covering all parameters.
One environment model can be reused across all the in-
dicator models of one transformer. The weather and loading
conditions always provide the environment in which the trans-
former is operating, and so training a new CAD model for the
suite involves training the indicator model, and learning the
correlations between it and the existing environment model.
However, loading may differ between units on the same site,
so the environment model should be tailored to the specific
transformer.
After the required suite of CAD models have been trained,
they are run in parallel for on-line anomaly detection. Multi-
agent systems technology [12] provides the software frame-
work for this on-line system, allowing data processing modules
to be flexibly added and upgraded as the system is running.
The system architecture is shown in Figure 6.
The first stage of on-line operation is to collect new mea-
surements as they are recorded. As mentioned in Section II,
data is archived to a data warehouse for long term storage,
which can be accessed on-line through a web service interface
[13]. Every five minutes, the Data Provider Agent connects to
the web service and requests the most recent measurements.
The Data Director Agent filters the site data to find groups
of measurements needed by the CAD Model Agents (that
is, the appropriate weather, load, and transformer parameters
that are inputs to the CAD models). Finally, any identified
anomalies that result from the CAD models are recorded by
the CAD Report Agent, which keeps a record of the number
and frequency of anomalies in the last seven days, and the last
30 days. The output of all analysis is logged with an agent for
archiving.
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Fig. 6. On-line system architecture, showing data processing tasks performed
by separate agents.
The CAD Report Agent performs simple comparisons of
anomalies across multiple CAD models, and also across
multiple transformers in the same substation. The knowledge
of which transformer subsystems recorded anomalies simul-
taneously can help the engineer assess the cause and risk;
and a comparison of the two sister units can be similarly
informative. If anomalies are detected on both transformers at
the same time, the cause may be network-related or substation-
wide, whereas problems confined to one transformer suggest
a change in that unit.
In addition to detecting and recording anomalies, the in-
formation must be presented to engineers. This is achieved
through the interface agent, which populates a web-based
engineer’s interface with site information. At the first level,
engineers are presented with a table of the current CAD mod-
els, and whether any anomalies have been detected recently
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by one or more of them. By selecting one of the models, the
engineer can see histograms of anomalous behavior during the
last seven and 30 days, giving an indication of the frequency
of anomalous behavior. Finally, the most detailed level of
information allows investigation of the CAD model output,
showing each parameter of the environment and indicator
models in graphical form, and the position and probability
of a given measurement. These three levels of information
allow the engineer to find correlations between anomalies in
sub-components, investigate whether anomalous behavior is
increasing in frequency, and visualize exactly which parame-
ters are behaving anomalously.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes the technique of Conditional Anomaly
Detection, and how it can be applied to transformer monitor-
ing. A particular application is given, where two in-service
transformers are being monitored by a range of temperature,
vibration, and other sensors. The results of applying CAD to a
twelve month set of site data showed that 21 anomalies were
detected. Analysis of these anomalies found that they were all
attributable to sensor faults giving anomalous measurements.
The utility’s analysis concurs with this assessment, as no
transformer faults were found during this time. This indicates
that the CAD technique can be applied to on-line monitoring
of transformers, and can detect unusual behavior. Finally, the
system for on-line anomaly detection is described, with detail
of the system components needed to provide a solution that
supports engineers in decision making.
While previous work presented a method of automatically
learning thresholds for point anomaly detection [9], this paper
shows how to provide contextual anomaly detection, with the
potential to reduce “false alarm” anomalies due to unusual
operating and environmental conditions. Further work will
investigate two avenues. The suite of CAD models can be
increased to cover new types of sensor as they are added to
plant, and in particular, a model of the transformer’s insulation
would be beneficial for end-of-life monitoring. Secondly,
the potential of collective anomaly detection techniques for
transformer monitoring will be studied. Such techniques learn
patterns of plant behavior over time, and can detect when a
change in parameter value is anomalous, compared to contex-
tual anomalies which occur when a value is anomalous given
other parameters. A type of collective anomaly detection has
recently been applied to a single parameter: partial discharge
data [7], and a multivariate version of this technique teamed
with CAD could enhance the information about anomalies
presented to engineers.
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